From the definitions given above it should be very clear that sentience is integral to the understanding of animal welfare. Most concerns for animal welfare, and the animal species to which these concerns are extended, are because these animals are believed to have feelings which matter to them, and to be capable of the experience of pain and suffering. More recently, with the modern definitions of welfare that consider positive emotions also to be relevant for welfare, the capacity of sentient animals to feel pleasure and contentment is also important.
Legally, in many countries, an acceptance of animal sentience is written into law:
· In the European Union, the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009, recognises that animals are sentient and mandates member states to pay full regard to animal welfare when formulating policy.
· A number of other countries or states, such as New Zealand, Quebec (Canada) and Oregon (USA), have also since amended their laws to recognise animal sentience.
Although animal sentience is not always well defined in the legislation, this has allowed countries to explain what this should mean in practice. In New Zealand, the recognition of animal sentience was considered to allow them to ‘set a new standard for society’s expectation of the way animal are treated by focusing on positive welfare states and…enhancements.’ In Quebec, animals were distinguished from property by stating that ‘animals are not things. They are sentient beings and have biological needs’. In the European Parliament, animals are now considered ‘living beings endowed with sensitivity, interests of their own and dignity, that benefit from special protection’.
Thus, animal sentience is important for animal welfare because the very definition of animal welfare rests on the ability of animals to experience subjectively positive and negative emotional states, and because the protections given to animals in law can be defined in terms of their sentience.
There are differing accepted ethical views or theories distinguished by moral philosophers which could apply to our treatment of animals. Some of these are contrasting positions, which might lead to markedly different positions about what is acceptable in interacting with animals. The following six views / theories are widely described positions when considering animals:
1) Contractarian view
2) Utilitarian view
3) The animal rights view
4) Virtue ethics view
5) The relational view
6) The respect for nature view
1) Contractarian View
The key principle of this view is: ‘Morality is based on agreement’
This view suggests that being moral is in your own self-interest. By showing consideration for the feelings or positions of others, we are really behaving in a way that is for our own sake. Part of these arguments suggest that only human are truly able to make contracts, and as animals cannot, then people only need to treat them as well as is needed for them to be used effectively. This moral position suggests that any animal use for human benefit, such as food, new medical treatment or financial gain (such as entertainment) is acceptable. This view only protects animals where they matter to people, and might confer greater protection on an animal that is important to humans, rather than for its own sake.
In reality this ethical view might explain how the same species (for example a rabbit) might be treated differently, both legally and in terms of accepted approaches, if it is a pet rabbit, a food rabbit, a laboratory rabbit or a wild rabbit often considered a pest in some environments. The rabbit is still a rabbit in all situations, but the view of the rabbit’s value changes depending on which situation the rabbit is from the perspective of human benefit.
2) Utilitarianism
The key principle of this view is: ‘Morality is about maximising human and animal well-being
This theory is a well-known and well-used approach to animal ethics, but is based on benevolence towards animals as its starting point, not self interest (as in the Contractarian view). The aim of this view is to maximise the benefits and to always attempt to bring about the best possible consequences from our actions, taking into account all those affected by the decision. This form of ethics was developed by the English Philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, in the 1700s, based on earlier thinking and writing of the Greek hedonists, Aristippus and Epicurus. Many areas where we might think about animal use, such as for food or use in experiments, have been considered under the utilitarian ethical arguments. For example, Peter Singer (a well-known American professor and pioneer of the animal liberation movement) has used utilitarian ethical reasoning to argue that, if it is possible to survive and be healthy without eating meat, milk, fish or dairy, then one ought to choose not to eat animal products because this is an unnecessary harm to the animals (considering the benefits to the animals). Similarly, with experimental studies, an ethical review of the benefits of the research (often the benefits to humans) is considered against the possible harms (usually to the animals) when deciding if it is ethically acceptable to carry out the research.
3) The Animal Rights View
The key principle of this view is: ‘Good results cannot justify evil means’
This ethical view can be considered as legal rights (which are created and exist within legal systems) and moral rights (which are not created by law). Although rights were originally seen as being something akin to ‘moral status’ and only held by humans, some philosophers have extended this view to animals as well. They argue that rights should not be just based on biological arguments (such as belonging to the species Homo sapiens), but should be extended to all animals possessing particular capacities or capabilities (such as sentience). Supporters of animal rights can span a range of differing positions concerning which capacities that animals must have to have rights, and which rights should be extended to animals. For some supporters of this ethical view, such as Tom Regan (a well-known philosopher of animal rights), all creatures that are sentient should have equal rights and inherent value, regardless of their use to others. This view then explicitly contradicts the utilitarian view that suggests that some animals can suffer if this is for the greater good, and the total sum of benefit is greater than the amount of suffering. For animal rights supporters ‘the disrespectful treatment of the individual in the name of social good [is] something the rights view will not…ever allow’ (Regan, 1989, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’).
4) Virtue Ethics View
The key principle of this view is: How would a morally virtuous person treat animals?
This ethical view addresses how to be a morally virtuous person in the way we behave towards animals, where virtue can be considered to be in possession of a consistent and persistent set of dispositions to think, behave, judge and feel in the right way. This may lead to feelings of mercy towards animals, or lead people to behave with compassion, temperance and honesty instead of callousness, cruelty or greed. Unlike some other ethical views, such as utilitarianism or rights views, a significant role for emotions is allowed, as well as reason. This view can also be related to the ethics of care – where it can be considered wrong to harm animals not because it will cause more suffering (as with the utilitarian view) or because the animal has rights which will be violated (the rights view) but because harming the animal reflects a lack of care or an inappropriate emotional response in the person doing the harming. These ethical views are considered contextual views of our ethical responsibilities towards animals, and a specific area of ethical thinking in this area is the relational view.
5) The Relational View
The key principle of this view is: ‘Morality grows out of our relationship with animals and one another’
This is a relatively modern ethical view that considers that the right thing to do is about the relationships that we have with others, including animals. A key part of this is about respect, and this branch of ethics is often used in health care and clinical practice, although it can also apply to our treatment of animals. This places an importance on the relationships between animals and humans, and thus our duties towards animals depend on whether they are close to us or not, or whether they are under our care or not (such as comparing domestic animals to wildlife). This is similar to virtue ethics (discussed at 19.4.4) but goes further in encouraging close relationships between humans and animals, and that responsibilities lie in the closeness of those relationships. Thus, following this view, a relational theorist might argue that our pet dog should be treated better than an animal on a farm or in a laboratory (at least by the owner) as the relationship is stronger. In addition, we may have a greater moral obligation towards domestic animals, as we have to some extent ‘created’ them through selective breeding, compared to wild animals. Whilst this might well be what happens in practice, this does mean that there might be categories of animals, such as wildlife pests, to which no protection at all might be extended.
6) The Respect for Nature View
The previous ethical or moral views of our treatment of animals have all focused on animals as individuals, and that their sentience and capacity to suffer is a key acceptance of these views. However, moral concerns about animals may also be based on other approaches that are not based on suffering, such as respecting nature or naturalness. This may mean that an entire species may be valued, or the role of a species within an ecosystem. To this way of thinking the loss of a species through extinction is bad in and of itself, not just because of its consequences for the well-being of humans and animals. Unlike the relational view, which regards close relationships as particularly valuable, the respect for nature ethical view tends to focus predominantly on ‘wild’ or ‘natural’ species, is likely to deplore genetic modification of species (such as selective breeding of livestock), and may support activities to preserve a species at the expense of the individuals. So, for example, if we took the last few remaining individuals of a species and confined them in a zoo to allow breeding and protection in various ways this might be seen as desirable from the point of view of preserving the species, in this ethical view, although the welfare of those individuals might be seen to suffer.
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